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Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) have been identified by the European 
Commission as a key enabler of interoperability among private and public 
undertakings. Moreover, a systematic adoption of open and standardized APIs by firms 
and developers appears to be crucial for unlocking competition and promoting the 
flourishing of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Internet of Things (IoT) innovation.  
 
An analysis of the main European regulatory initiatives which have so far surfaced in 
the realm of data governance (right to personal data portability, free flow of non-
personal data, access to customer account data rule, re-use of government data) reveals 
that the EU legislature is not tackling the matter consistently. While all of these 
initiatives share a reliance on APIs for the facilitation of a sound and effective data 
sharing ecosystem, they vary in terms of rationale, scope and implementation. 
Furthermore, data sharing via APIs requires a complex implementation process, and 
technicalities are crucial for their success. Moreover, an excessive reliance on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms might be overestimated when it 
comes to data compensation, as has been demonstrated by the continuing saga 
involving standard essential patents. 
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In July 2018 four tech giants, namely Microsoft, Google, Twitter and Facebook, announced 
the launch of a joint open-source initiative, called the Data Transfer Project, with the 
objective of easing user data transfer among their platforms.1 According to the declarations, 
this new data portability mechanism will remove the infrastructure burden on providers and 
users related to the portability of data from one company to another: “[T]he future of 
portability will need to be more inclusive, flexible, and open. We believe users should be 
able to seamlessly and securely transfer their data directly from one provider to another.”2 
This initiative demonstrates that data portability has become a key concern for major 
market players (“data portability and interoperability are central to innovation”),3 who have 
now decided to address the calls recently made by the European Commission for Open 
Data policies.4  
There is no doubt that data analytics tools are essential to optimize mechanisms and 
complex decision processes, and thereby allowing firms to thrive by extracting value from 
information and delivering tailored services with significant added value for consumer 
welfare. Accordingly, the free movement of data has emerged as a new building block of 
European policy, laying the foundation for the development of new innovations based on 
                                               
1 Google Open Source Blog, ‘Introducing Data Transfer Project: an open source platform promoting universal 
data portability’ (2018) <https://opensource.googleblog.com/2018/07/introducing-data-transfer-project.html> 
accessed 4 September 2018; C. Shank, ‘Microsoft, Facebook, Google and Twitter Introduce the Data Transfer 
Project: An Open Source Initiative for Consumer Data Portability’ (2018) 
<https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2018/07/20/microsoft-facebook-google-and-twitter-introduce-the-data-
transfer-project-an-open-source-initiative-for-consumer-data-portability/> accessed 4 September 2018. 
2 Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter, ‘Data transfer Project’, White Paper (2018) 4, 
<https://datatransferproject.dev/> accessed 4 September 2018. 
3 Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter (n 2) 3. 
4 European Commission, ‘Towards a thriving data-driven economy’ (Communication) COM (2014) 442 final, 




big data exploitation, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT).5 
AI environments are inherently dependent on data as an essential raw material, particularly 
with regards to machine learning and deep learning.6 Since AI functioning is based on the 
identification of patterns in available datasets and the subsequent making of predictions and 
correlations in order to solve technical problems, the availability of large amounts of 
information is crucial to its functioning.7 Hence, emerging technologies need continuous 
access to streams of data from several sources, generated by machines and connected 
devices. 
The dependence of IoT and AI applications on an enormous diversity of data sources and 
types requires format standardization, an efficient system for personal information 
management, and serious efforts to ensure interoperability. Indeed, IoT hinges on standard 
and interoperable communication protocols which allow for a dynamic global network 
infrastructure consisting of physical and virtual ‘things’ (such as traditional and 
autonomous vehicles, mobile phones, home devices, and so on).8 These devices are 
integrated by means of intelligent interfaces and create smart environments where each 
item is able to interact in order to improve its own usefulness.  
                                               
5 European Commission, ‘Building a European Data Economy’ (n 4) 8. 
6 See D. Harhoff, S. Heumann, N. Jentzsch and P. Lorenz, ‘Outline for a German Strategy for Artificial 
Intelligence’, (2018) 14-18, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222566> accessed 4 September 2018, arguing that an 
AI strategy also requires a data strategy. See also I.M. Cockburn, R. Henderson, and S. Stern, ‘The Impact of 
Artificial Intelligence on Innovation’, in A.K. Agrawal, J. Gans, and A. Goldfarb (eds.), The Economics of 
Artificial Intelligence (University of Chicago Press, 2019), advocating the proactive development of 
institutions and policies that encourage competition, data sharing, and openness as an important determinant 
of economic gains from the development and application of deep learning: indeed, because the performance 
of deep learning algorithms depends on the training data that they are created from, barriers to data sharing 
could result in a balkanization of data within each sector, not only reducing innovative productivity within the 
sector, but also reducing spillovers back to the deep learning general purpose technologies sector, and to other 
application sectors. 
7 European Commission, ‘Artificial Intelligence for Europe’, (Communication) COM (2018) 237 final, 4; 
European Commission, ‘Towards a common European data space’ (Communication) COM (2018) 232 final, 
2-3. 
8 PWC, ‘Cross-Cutting Business Models for IoT’, (2017) 2-3, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-




A key factor in the success of these cross-sector applications is the openness, according to 
agreed semantic models, of the transferable data .9 Therefore, data infrastructures capable 
of gathering and streaming a vast array of data as a sort of modern pipeline are going to be 
crucial for the IoT to flourish.10  EU firms need to be intensive data users in order to play an 
active role in these data-driven markets, but nowadays only 6.3% of European undertakings 
are able to proactively engage in such a new environment.11  
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that access to data and related data sharing 
practices have recently gained attention among policy makers as a crucial factor in 
unlocking competition and enabling innovation to flourish. With the European Data 
Economy initiative, the European Commission has made clear its intention to nurture the 
development of the data-driven economy by encouraging the sharing and reusing of data 
within the Internal Market.12 This initiative is linked to the European Parliament’s recent 
Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data in the EU, which aims at ensuring that no 
physical or legal barriers will hinder the development of the European data economy.13 In 
short, European policy makers are acknowledging the important function that massive data 
exploitation is going to have in the rise of both IoT and AI applications.14 As data-enabled 
                                               
9 Deloitte, ‘Study on emerging issues of data ownership, interoperability, (re-)usability and access to data, and 
liability’, (2017) 6, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/study-emerging-issues-data-
ownership-interoperability-re-usability-and-access-data-and> accessed 6 September 2018. 
10 H. Varian, ‘Artificial Intelligence, Economics, and Industrial Organization’, (2018) NBER Working Paper 
24839, 7 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w24839> accessed 4 September 2018.  
11 IDC and Open Evidence, ‘European Data Market Study’, (2017) 75 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/final-results-european-data-market-study-measuring-size-and-trends-eu-data-economy> 
accessed 6 September 2018.  
12 European Commission, ‘Towards a common European data space’ (n 7). 
13 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the free-flow of non-personal 
data in the European Union (not yet published in the Official Journal). See Recitals 1 and 9 acknowledging 
that the rapid development of the data economy and emerging technologies are raising novel legal issues 
surrounding questions of access to and reuse of data and that the expanding Internet of Things, artificial 
intelligence and machine learning, represent major sources of non-personal data. 
14 European Commission, ‘Guidance on sharing private sector data in the European data economy’ (Staff 




services hold the promise of strengthening competition and boosting innovation in both 
existing and newly arising markets, there is room for customers and businesses to benefit 
considerably from a data-driven economy.  
So far, regulatory interventions have focused on fostering as much data-driven innovation 
as possible by means of differing tools that work toward the same goal, namely the 
strengthening of competition through data sharing. This goal faces opposition, as firms 
holding large data pools are reluctant to share this value asset with actual or potential 
competitors. Additionally, concerns about confidentiality and trade secrets are likely to 
raise high barriers which may jeopardize the development of a common data space.15 The 
European Commission has already started to tackle these issues with a broad array of 
different legislative initiatives. While the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
introduced a general scope data portability right,16 the Second Payment Service Directive 
(PSD2) enshrined a sector-specific access to account data rule,17 and the recent Regulation 
on free-flow of non-personal data addresses data sharing practices in the commercial arena 
(business-to-business). Moreover, the Commission has introduced a proposal aimed at 
promoting the re-use of government data.18 Such a wide range of initiatives creates the risk 
of legal uncertainty for merchants and consumers.19   
                                               
15 I. Graef, M. Husovec, and N. Purtova, ‘Data Portability and Data Control: Lessons for an Emerging 
Concept in E.U. Law’, (2017) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-041, 10 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3071875> accessed 4 September 2018. 
16 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1, Art. 20.  
17 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on 
payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, [2015] OJ L337, Art. 67. 
18 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on the re-use of public sector information’, COM(2018) 
234 final. 




Against this background, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) have surfaced as a 
technical tool capable of ensuring a smooth flow of data between undertakings. They are 
sets of protocols which define how software components communicate with one another. 
By allowing a firm to easily access the data gathered by another company, APIs can 
strengthen interoperability among different players and facilitate the exchange of data 
streams or datasets between data holders. Despite their clear pro-competitive potential, 
there is no consensus regarding who should define the APIs or, even more importantly, 
whether to standardize their creation. To avoid such a risk, the EU institutions have 
encouraged companies across the Internal Market to consider using open, standardized and 
well-documented APIs more broadly. This could include making data available in machine-
readable formats and the provision of associated metadata. 
In light of this development, two main points merit investigation. First, the regulatory 
approach adopted by the EU reflects the idea that the antitrust enforcement toolbox is 
inadequate to tackle effectively the need to ensure access to data. The scope of competition 
law is limited by the fact that it can be invoked only to gain access to a dataset held by a 
dominant firm, on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, access can be imposed under antitrust 
law only if a refusal to grant access is considered abusive and if the resource at issue is 
considered essential according to the requirements established by case law. Second, even 
though API standardization is going to play a key role with reference to data access, we 
intend to sound a note of caution against the expectation that fair, reasonable and non-




among data holders and access seekers.20 Conversely, it is worth evaluating the ongoing 
implementation process under PSD2 of the access-to-account rule, as it is at an advanced 
stage and might provide a useful lesson on how to design sector-specific regulation 
mandating a workable access to data.  
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it aims to provide an overview of the main 
initiatives undertaken to enable access to data throughout the Internal Market and highlight 
the key role that APIs will play in this landscape. Second, drawing on the well-established 
antitrust literature on standardization and licensing practices, the paper will shed light on 
concerns and risks that could jeopardize the free movement of data. In this context, Section 
2 will focus on the most relevant data portability tools envisaged by the European Union, 
namely the data portability right under the GDPR, the access-to-account rule under the 
PSD2, the attempt to regulate free-flow of non-personal data and the re-use of government 
data. Section 3 will address the relationship between antitrust enforcement and the 
regulatory interventions mandating data sharing. Section 4 will conclude with 
recommendations aimed at designing a sound standardization framework based on a sector-
specific approach tailored to the needs of the new API economy. 
 
2. The manifold forms of data sharing and the role of APIs 
Any debate on data sharing and the possible ways to implement it effectively cannot ignore 
the crucial role that APIs are going to play across the whole spectrum of digital society.21 
                                               
20 See European Commission, ‘Building a European Data Economy’ (n 4) 13; European Commission, 
‘FinTech Action plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector’ (Communication) 
COM (2018) 109 final, 7. 




APIs can be defined in broad terms as software tools designed to enable communication 
between two computer applications.22 Through a set of protocols and routines, they allow a 
digital application to interact with an associated program by describing the kind of data that 
can be retrieved, how to accomplish the data retrieval, and the format in which information 
will be filed. These interfaces have different levels of complexity, such as simple links to 
databases or specific datasets, web getaways and more detailed set-ups. APIs are not only 
pieces of software, but they come with a contract that enshrines the terms and conditions of 
the license, and outlines how the interfaces can be used by developers. 
APIs offer a twofold advantage in terms of data sharing within and across companies. First, 
APIs set up a metering system of access to data held in a specific database or server, 
empowering providers with a sort of smart gateway to their data. Second, depending on 
whether they are closed or open, APIs represent the building blocks of modular industrial 
architecture and platform business models respectively.23 Closed (or internal) APIs are 
accessible only to those working within a firm. Companies use them because they enhance 
internal integration and speedy data sharing among different departments and employee 
teams. Indeed, a systematic and smooth sharing of data within a firm improves productivity 
by fostering better exploitation of internal data streams and optimizing existing processes.24 
Open (or external) APIs, on the contrary, are aimed at enabling integration with third 
parties (such as partners, external developers or even competitors) by allowing them to 
                                               
22 For a technical overview on the structure, functioning, and business impact of APIs, see G. Benzell, G. 
Lagarda, and M. Van Alstyne, ‘The Impact of APIs on Firm Performance’, (2017) Boston University 
Questrom School of Business Research Paper No. 2843326, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2843326> accessed 8 
September 2018; M. Zachariadis and P. Ozcan, ‘The API Economy and Digital Transformation in Financial 
Services: The Case of Open Banking’, (2017) SWIFT Institute Working Paper No. 2016-001, 
<https://swiftinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SIWP-2016-001-Impact-Open-APIs-FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 8 September 2018. 
23 Zachariadis and Ozcan (n 22) 6. 




access specific datasets. Such external interfaces are at the very heart of interoperability and 
modularity, both of which characterize the modern business platform models.25  
By allowing for data sharing and interoperability with third parties, open APIs lead to up-
selling as well as cross-selling opportunities; this allows digital marketplace environments 
to flourish down the line. Further, APIs provide a scalable mechanism of governance and 
platform management, thereby ensuring, to the benefit of the platform owner, control as 
well as monetization. The monetization opportunities of APIs vary widely depending on the 
business method enacted by the provider. Furthermoe, the potential copyrightability of 
APIs could further strengthen the proprietary rights of API owners.26 Owing to all these 
features, the adoption of APIs generates decreases in operating costs as well as increases in 
sales, market capitalization, intangible assets, and net income.27 Thus, it is not surprising 
that nowadays some of the most valuable companies in the world, such as Google, 
Microsoft and Apple, all share a platform ecosystem model based on external communities 
of developers.28 
With regard to the interoperability of digital interactive television services, the European 
authorities stated as long ago as 2002 that the migration from existing APIs to new open 
APIs should be encouraged and facilitated.29 Hence, they invited Member States to 
                                               
25 Benzell, Lagarda, and Van Alstyne (n 22) 3. 
26  On the on-going debate taking place in the US with reference to APIs’ copyrightability in the aftermath of 
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F3d 1179 (2018 Fed. Cir.), see P.S. Menell, ‘Rise of the API 
Copyright Dead: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features of 
Computer Software’, (2018) 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 305.  
27 Benzell, Lagarda, and Van Alstyne (n 22) 32. 
28 G. Parker, M. Van Alstyne, and X. Jiang, ‘Platform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the Firm’, (2016) 
Boston University Questrom School of Business Research Paper No. 2861574, 1, 
<http://ide.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Platform%20Ecosystems-
%20How%20Developers%20Invert%20the%20Frim.pdf> accessed 8 September 2018. 
29 Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 




“encourage proprietors of APIs to make available on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms, and against appropriate remuneration, all such information as is 
necessary to enable providers of digital interactive television services to provide all services 
supported by the API in a fully functional form.”30 However, it must be acknowledged that 
the increasing number and heterogeneity of market players is likely to lead to conflicts of 
interest among platform owners and third-party developers which could lead to litigations 
and exclusionary or exploitative behaviors.31 In this respect, APIs can be deployed to 
engage in anti-competitive practices to the detriment of newcomers or, conversely, to 
control the platform and ensure an effective level of regulatory predictability by the 
owner.32 Depending on how platform owners make use of their open APIs, they can limit or 
foster access to the relevant APIs or even carry out discriminatory practices.  
Among EU policy makers, the necessity of ensuring interoperability of datasets for a 
thriving data-driven economy has attracted interest since the European Council’s 
conclusions of October 2013, which focused on the digital economy, innovation and 
services as drivers for growth and jobs.33 Notably, in 2014 the European Commission 
started advocating the adoption of standardized and “shared formats and protocols for 
gathering and processing data from different sources in a coherent and interoperable 
manner across sectors and vertical markets.”34 More recently, the European Commission 
has begun to “explore a possible future EU framework for data access.”35 The underlying 
                                               
30 Directive 2002/21/EC (n 30) Article 18(2). 
31 Zachariadis and Ozcan (n 22) 8. 
32 Zachariadis and Ozcan (n 22) 8. 
33 European Council, ‘Conclusions of the European Council (24/25 October 2013)’ EUCO 169/13, 4.  
34 European Commission, ‘Towards a thriving data-driven economy’ (n 4) 6. See also M.S. Gal and D. 
Rubinfeld, ‘Data Standardization’, mimeo, arguing that, since not all data are alike, standardization of data 
semantics, attributes, structure, formats, or interfaces is needed in order to facilitate interoperability. 




goal of such a far-reaching initiative is to establish a pro-competitive environment where 
the sharing, aggregation and reuse of machine-generated data could be a source of new 
business models, in addition to “making relevant data available for training AI 
applications.”36 Against this background, APIs’ architecture and design has been identified 
as a crucial element for a flourishing common European data space. Consequently, the 
Commission has envisaged the adoption of a “broader use of open, standardized and well-
documented APIs … through technical guidance, including identification and spreading of 
best practice for companies and public sector bodies.”37 Moreover, the Commission has 
launched an assessment process aimed at deciding how best to encourage undertakings to 
adopt “open, standardized and well-documented APIs.”38  
As already mentioned, the European Commission has started to tackle the issues of data 
sharing and interoperability with a broad array of legislative initiatives aimed at promoting 
data portability. Indeed, data interoperability considerations are closely related to questions 
of data portability, since “effective portability policies must be supported by appropriate 
technical standards in order to implement meaningful portability in a technologically 
neutral manner.”39 Therefore, it is worth carrying out a comparison of the major European 
legislative attempts to enact data sharing regimes in order to evaluate whether and how they 
can effectively help to achieve the ambitious goal of a common data space. 
 
 
                                               
36 European Commission, ‘Towards a common European data space’ (n 7) 10. 
37 European Commission, ‘Building a European Data Economy’ (n 4) 12. 
38 European Commission, ‘Guidance on sharing private sector data in the European data economy’ (n 14) 8. 




2.1. Personal data portability 
The right to data portability enacted by the GDPR has been praised as a complete novelty 
within the EU data protection landscape.40 Leaving aside the access-to-account rule under 
the PSD2, no attempt to enact a similar regulatory initiative has been pursued before.41 In 
fact, this innovation can be read as the first complement to the Digital Single Market 
Strategy launched by the European Commission in 2015.42 Moreover, as a substantial part 
of the data flowing throughout the Internal Market is personal data (according to the broad 
definition set forth in the GDPR), such a regime is a cornerstone of the European data 
common space.43  
In essence, with this legislative instrument the EU seeks to empower individuals by 
granting them more control over their personal data.44  The right to data portability aims at 
enabling a smooth data transfer process from one data controller to the other by means of a 
threefold structure. More specifically, pursuant to Article 20 of the GDPR, the right to data 
portability consists of three different rights granted to the data subject, namely the right to 
receive a copy of the data provided to the data controller, the right to transmit those data to 
                                               
40 As pointed out in P. De Hert, V. Papakonstantinou, G. Malgieri, L. Baslay, and I. Sanchez, ‘The right to 
data portability in the GDPR: Towards user-centric interoperability of digital services’ (2018) 34 Computer 
Law and Security Review 193, 194, the closest theoretical precursor of data portability is the number 
portability enshrined in the Article 30 of the Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services.  
41 B. Custers and H. Ursic, ‘Big Data and Data Reuse: a taxonomy of data reuse for balancing big data 
benefits and personal data protection’ (2016) 6 International Data Privacy Law 4, 9. 
42 European Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) COM (2015) 192 
final, 14. 
43 GDPR (n 16) Article 4. 
44 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on the right to ‘data portability’’ (2017), 2, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611233> accessed 9 September 2018; 
GDPR (n 16) Recital 68. See also G. Colangelo and M. Maggiolino, ‘Fragile or Smart Consumers? 
Suggestions for the US from the EU’ (2018) Stanford-Vienna TTLF Working Paper No. 36, 8-9, 




another controller and the right to request a direct transfer from one controller to another.45 
The first two rights can be freely exercised (provided that the processing is based on 
consent or on a contract and is carried out by automated means). Conversely, the third is 
dependent on its technical feasibility, meaning the interoperability of the systems 
involved.46 Furthermore, since these rights are within the general scope of the GDPR, every 
controller is obliged to comply with them regardless of its size, the reasons for which 
portability is sought or the scale of its processing activity.  
In addition, by affirming individuals’ control over their personal data, data portability is 
expected to tackle personal data lock-in problems, ‘re-balance’ the relationship between 
data subjects and data controllers (i.e., between digital consumers and digital platforms), 
and encourage competition between companies.47 Indeed, the rationale for the data 
portability right fits better within a competition policy framework than it does within the 
traditional data protection systems founded on Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Customer empowerment by means of individual control over personal data has the 
potential to unlock competition within data-driven markets.48 Thus, the main goal 
underpinning data portability is the promotion of competition among data-enabled service 
providers rather than the creation of a form of default ownership by personal data 
                                               
45 GDPR (n 16) Article 20. 
46 GDPR (n 16) Recital 68. 
47 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 44) 4. See also European Commission, ‘Stronger protection, 
new opportunities - Commission guidance on the direct application of the General Data Protection Regulation 
as of 25 May 2018’, (Communication) COM (2018) 43 final. 
48 O. Lynskey, ‘Aligning data protection rights with competition law remedies? The GDPR right to data 
portability’, (2017) European Law Review 793, 803. See also V. Kathuria and J.C. Lai, ‘User Review 
Portability: Why and How?’ (2018) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2018-023, 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3203344> accessed 10 September 2018, exploring the possibility of porting user 




subjects.49 A proper data portability remedy stemming from competition law, however, 
would be different, as it would apply to all (personal and not personal) data held by 
dominant firms on a case-by-case basis. 
As it stands, the right to personal data portability is likely to prove problematic with regard 
to its implementation. In fact, Article 20(1) of the GDPR does not provide detailed 
guidance on how to ensure data portability among undertakings. It merely states a general 
requirement for the format of transmitted data, which need to be “structured, commonly 
used and machine readable.” Further, any attempt to mandate the adoption of interoperable 
standards is excluded, as Recital 68 does not go beyond a simple “encouragement”. Such 
lack of any binding provision or detailed guideline covering the implementation of data 
portability is likely to raise serious concerns about effectiveness and legal certainty. 
Interoperability and portability need to be made effective, otherwise they will remain a 
dead letter.50 For its part, the WP29 advisory group suggested the adoption of APIs to 
implement data portability with a sector-specific approach.51 However, nothing is 
mentioned with reference to their structure (open or closed), potential standardization 
attempts or terms and conditions of the license.52  
The major risk stemming from this light-touch regulatory approach is an inconsistent 
development of personal data portability throughout the market, which could ultimately 
                                               
49 In fact, property would entail the right to exclude anyone, which is not provided by the right to data 
portability under the GDPR. Similarly, the right to erasure under the GDPR (Article 17) cannot be considered 
a proprietary tool, due to its extremely limited (and highly contested) applicability. On this point, see Graef, 
Husovec, and Purtova (n 15) 24. Instead, for a view supporting a proprietary setting, see De Hert, 
Papakonstantinou, Malgieri, Baslay, Sancez, (n 40) 201. 
50 O. Borgogno and C. Poncibò, ‘The Day After Tomorrow of Banking - On FinTech, Data Control and 
Consumer Empowerment’ (2018) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/04/law-and-
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hinder the development of a European common data space. In fact, even though some 
sectors are already at an advanced stage in providing applications for transferring data, 
other market players might struggle to keep pace with such development when no open 
interoperability standards are yet available.53 The Data Transfer Project launched by 
Microsoft, Google, Twitter and Facebook explicitly promises to smooth the movement of 
data among service providers, but minor competitors or small firms are likely to lose 
further ground in the battle for the data as a direct consequence of the tech giants’ efforts.54 
In fact, without a serious and detailed open standardization effort, business costs arising 
from data portability compliance might jeopardize competition rather than enable it to 
thrive. Moreover, leaving market players completely free to adopt poorly secured and 
flawed APIs can lead to massive data breaches and open the gate to cybersecurity attacks, 
as demonstrated by the Cambridge Analytica scandal.55 
 
2.2. Free-flow of non-personal data  
As part of its general strategy, the European Commission took a further step in the direction 
of building a common data space by targeting the free flow of non-personal data through a 
specific regulation proposal.56 It is predicted that this legislative tool, together with the 
GDPR, will complete a comprehensive and coherent EU framework that enables free 
movement of data in the single market.  
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The core objective of the Regulation is threefold. First and foremost, it introduces what can 
be considered the fifth freedom in addition to the four traditional ones (involving citizens, 
goods, services and capital), namely the free movement of data within the Union.57 
Accordingly, apart from restrictions justified on public security grounds, Member States 
would lose the power to oblige undertakings to process or locate data within their borders 
by setting, for instance, data localization requirements. At the same time, such provisions 
would not affect the principle of data availability for regulatory control, which represents 
the second cornerstone of the proposal.58 Lastly, the Regulation acknowledges that “the 
ability to port data without hindrance is a key facilitator of user choice and effective 
competition.”59 Hence, the Regulation entrusts the European Commission to encourage and 
facilitate the development of self-regulatory codes of conduct, in order to define guidelines 
on best practices in facilitating the switching of providers and to ensure that they provide 
professional users with sufficiently detailed, clear and transparent information before a 
contract for data storage and processing is concluded.60 Pursuant to Article 6, these 
guidelines should take into account: (a) best practices for facilitating the switching of 
service providers and the porting of data in a structured, commonly used and machine-
readable format including open standard formats where required or requested by the service 
provider receiving the data; (b) minimum information requirements to ensure that 
professional users are provided, before a contract for data processing is concluded, with 
sufficiently detailed, clear and transparent information regarding the processes, technical 
requirements, timeframes and charges that apply in case a professional user wants to switch 
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to another service provider or port data back to its own IT systems; (c) approaches to 
certification schemes that facilitate the comparison of data processing products and services 
for professional users to facilitate the comparability of those products and services; (d) 
communication roadmaps taking a multi-disciplinary approach to raise awareness of the 
codes of conduct among relevant stakeholders.  
The legislative initiative at issue is not immune from criticism. Article 6 creates a new right 
of business-to-business data portability, similar to the right provided to personal data by 
Article 20 of the GDPR; however the distinction between personal and non-personal data is 
far from straightforward. Indeed, since the scope of the latter depends on the former, it 
would be necessary to embark on the challenging enterprise of delimiting the slippery 
definition of personal data, which is currently phrased by the GDPR as “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’).”61 According to the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as well as the relevant 
opinion issued by the Article 29 Working Party, it is clear that whether the personal data 
“relates to” an “identified or identifiable” individual is ultimately a case-by-case 
assessment, since these are extremely broad concepts constantly subject to dynamic 
contextual adaptation.62 This interpretative issue is further exacerbated in the current data-
driven economy, as IoT and AI advance information de-anonymization and organization 
hyper-connectivity.  
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Leaving aside these normative concerns, the Regulation demonstrates the strong 
willingness of EU policy makers to enact a comprehensive form of non-personal data 
portability able to better meet the competitive need of data-driven markets. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the European Commission has more recently acknowledged, upon pressure 
from several stakeholders, that nudging firms towards the adoption of interoperability 
standards might be more appropriate than horizontal legislation on data sharing in business-
to-business relations.63 This implies that data trading governance will continue to be based 
on freedom of contract rather than on hypothetical forms of ownership.  
Given these circumstances, APIs are set to take center stage again. Nowadays many firms 
which hold significant data pools do not leverage their commercial potential or, more often, 
prevent other companies from accessing them, thereby hindering competition and, 
ultimately, innovation.64 A wise first step in tackling this problem effectively could be the 
encouragement of a systematic use of secured and open APIs. As envisaged by the 
European Commission, the establishment and employment of these interfaces would 
require them to be grounded on “stability, maintenance over the lifecycle, uniformity of use 
and standards, user-friendliness as well as security”.65 Accordingly, the creation of an EU 
Support Centre for data sharing has been announced under the Connecting Europe Facility 
Programme in April 2018. Its main objective will be to assist firms in developing sound 
APIs with best-practices examples, model contracts and other technical and legal support. 
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2.3. Account data portability  
Alongside the general-purpose data portability right enacted through the GDPR, a sector-
specific form of data portability has emerged in the field of payment services, namely the 
access to account rule (XS2A rule) enshrined in the PSD2, which came into force on 13 
January 2018. Pursuant to this new regulatory mechanism, account-servicing payment 
service providers (ASPSPs), such as banks, shall allow third parties to obtain real-time data 
relating to customers’ accounts and are required to provide access to such accounts by 
executing payment orders initiated through digital interfaces, on the condition that 
customers give their explicit consent and that the account is accessible online.66 
Furthermore, banks are under the obligation to grant such access on a non-discriminatory 
basis both to payment initiation services (PISs)67 and account information services 
(AISs).68 More specifically, any ASPSP shall treat and execute all the payment orders 
transmitted via a third-party’s interface as if they were sent directly by the customer 
through the banking infrastructure, “without any discrimination other than for objective 
reasons, in particular in terms of timing, priority or charges vis-à-vis payment orders 
transmitted directly by the payer.”69  
This regulatory intervention aims to address the competitive concerns affecting the retail-
banking sector and to nurture FinTech innovation. Notably, by introducing the XS2A rule, 
the PSD2 marked a crucial step towards the opening of retail payment markets to 
authorized newcomers, who from now on will have the right to request account information 
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without any previous agreements with banks. In this way, the EU aims to promote 
competition within retail payment markets for the benefit of customers by giving them 
greater bargaining power and control over their data. Indeed, financial services are awash in 
data and many financial services and products could be impacted as the use of big data 
technologies may serve various purposes (from profiling customers and identifying patterns 
of consumption in order to make targeted offers and personalize products and services, to 
support finance and risk control activities).70  
The XS2A rule fosters competition in the banking and financial services industry and opens 
the path towards an “Open Banking” environment.71 The term “Open Banking” is used to 
denote a foreseen evolution in banking in which consumers are enabled to share their data 
with third parties through the use of open APIs. However, the implementation process of 
the data portability right under the GDPR is going to be crucial in determining the success 
of such regulatory intervention.  
Among firms and regulators, APIs are widely believed to be the most reliable instrument 
for implementing the XS2A rule.72 Nevertheless, the process of APIs’ definition is a hotly 
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debated issue, as there is a clear conflict of interest between traditional banking incumbents 
and FinTech entrants.73 Following a public consultation carried out during 2017, the 
European Commission found that most respondents considered interoperability as a priority 
for the FinTech market, and believed there was a need for further standardization.74 
Accordingly, standards and technical specifications should be developed through private 
ordering initiatives, and the use of global (rather than national or regional) standards should 
be promoted. Furthermore, most respondents called for the adoption of an open source 
model where libraries of open source solutions would be made available to developers and 
innovators.  
From a competition policy angle, a major concern stems from the likelihood that banks may 
design their own APIs in subtly different ways that would make it extremely tricky (and far 
more expensive) for third party providers to develop services capable of plugging-in with 
each of them. This would result in a chronic lack of interoperability and would negatively 
affect consumer welfare. Furthermore, even the PSD2 objectives of commonality and 
harmonization would be seriously put at risk. For these reasons, allowing a wide range of 
API standards to be adopted to implement account data portability would pose a serious 
threat. A minimum level of standardization would instead allow developers to design 
innovative applications that work efficiently across the market in a harmonized way. 
In light of these concerns, the European Commission has started advocating “the 
development of open standards that increase competition, enhance interoperability and 
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simplify the exchange of and access to data between market players”.75 Moreover, the 
European Parliament has expressed its preference for the creation of a set of standardized 
APIs that undertakings could deploy as a shared language and has highlighted the 
importance of interoperability for the rise of FinTech innovation.76 Accordingly, standard-
setting regulatory initiatives are emerging. For instance, the ‘Berlin Group’ has gained 
attention among policy makers. The group is an interoperability standards and 
harmonization initiative led by a pan-European standardization body – which includes 
banks, payment associations, banking associations, interbank processors, and payment 
schemes – with the objective of setting open and common standards in the inter-banking 
domain. Additionally, a task force has been established with the goal of designing an open, 
common and harmonized European API standard to enable third party providers to access 
bank accounts under the PSD2. At the same time, the English Consumer and Market 
Authority, together with the UK Government Open Banking Working Group, is paving the 
way for an Open Banking environment through the creation of an open API framework that 
is even more ambitious than PSD2’s goals.77 Furthermore, the complexity and the risk of 
inconsistency in the implementation of the XS2A rule led the European Banking Authority 
to intervene by issuing an Opinion aimed at providing assistance to the private 
standardization bodies merged across the EU.78  
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The implementation process of the XS2A rule makes it abundantly clear how challenging 
and troublesome ensuring the effectiveness of data sharing within an industry can be, 
especially when conflicting interests are at stake.  
The EU effort to establish a sound legal framework for data sharing within financial 
markets has drawn the attention of several other countries, which have begun to follow the 
European route. The Canadian Competition Bureau, for instance, has invited policy makers 
to encourage open access to systems and data through APIs;79 it has stated that regulators 
should encourage the use of technology to facilitate account switching, and the use of APIs 
to access consumers’ portfolio information can help make switching easier. Furthermore, in 
2017 Japan amended the Banking Act to promote open innovation enabling FinTech 
companies to access financial institutions’ systems via API connections. Moreover, the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore has set up an APIs register to serve as the initial landing 
site for Open APIs available in the Singapore financial industry. Finally, in order to ensure 
the sharing of users’ financial, aggregate and transactional data, Article 76 of the recent 
Mexican FinTech Law (Ley de Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera) requires financial 
entities and FinTech institutions to establish APIs to allow, with the prior consent of users, 
connectivity and access to interfaces developed or managed by other financial entities and 
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2.4. Re-use of government data  
Public undertakings are tremendous collectors of information (e.g. statistics, digital maps, 
meteorological data, legal information, and so forth). Public sector information (PSI) is 
acknowledged as a valuable resource for the digital economy both in terms of raw material 
for data-enabled services and for the more accurate decision-making it provides society. 
Indeed, the total direct economic value of PSI peaked at a level of 52 billion euros in 2017, 
and it is expected to increase to 194 billion by 2030.80 Allowing such data to be reused for 
other purposes by private and public undertakings might enable the delivery of new 
services and products across several sectors of the Internal Market. It would also boost the 
development of new technologies which rely on the continuous processing of vast amounts 
of high-quality data-streams. On top of that, policymaking and public administration 
activity are likely to benefit in terms of efficiency and effectiveness from interaction with 
technology companies which are leveraging big data. 
Given the abovementioned potential of public and publicly-funded data, the European 
Commission, as part of its Digital Single Market strategy, decided to encourage data reuse 
and PSI access through a review of the Directive 2003/98/EC.81 This legislative initiative 
has been designed to achieve several objectives through a multi-level effort.82 First, it aims 
at lowering transaction costs related to accessing PSI for small and medium-sized firms. 
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Second, new categories of data would fall under the scope of the revised Directive, such as 
those related to public utilities, transport and research. Third, the proposal addresses the 
problem of excessive first-mover advantages arising from poorly designed public-private 
arrangements that can ultimately lead to a monopolistic exploitation of PSI by a few 
players. This risk has been mitigated by extending the range of ‘re-users’ and by providing 
widespread notice of the availability of PSI. Fourth, a systematic uptake of APIs has been 
identified as the right instrument to ensure smooth access to dynamic dataflow.83 
Therefore, in accordance with the overall strategy enacted by the European Commission for 
a common data space, APIs are also set to play a crucial role in the sharing of publicly-
funded data. In essence, the proposed changes to the Directive aim at speeding up the 
transition of public sector bodies towards digitally-enabled functionalities and contributing 
to the creation of a valuable ecosystem around data assets. It is worth highlighting that 
particular attention has been paid by the Commission to the technical details of API set-up 
and practical use, as they would need to be based on availability, stability, maintenance 
over lifecycle, uniformity of use and standards, user-friendliness as well as security.84 
Moreover, public sector bodies will be entrusted with the task of making data available for 
access immediately after collection by means of suitable interfaces. To the extent that 
fundamental high-value datasets are involved, public bodies would be under a strong 
obligation to systematically adopt suitable APIs. In this respect, the revised Directive 
                                               
83 European Commission, ‘Towards a common European data space’ (n 7) 5-6: “Providing access to dynamic 
data via application programming interfaces is particularly important, as it supports the open data ecosystem, 
saves time and costs through automation of the download process, and greatly facilitates the re-use of data for 
a wide range of new products and services. Sharing data via the correct and secure use of application 
programming interfaces can generate significant added value for different actors of the data value chain. It can 
also contribute to the creation of valuable ecosystems around data assets whose potential is often unused by 
data holders.” 





explicitly provides that APIs shall be used by public bodies to ensure real-time access to 
data “in a timeframe that does not unduly impair the exploitation of their economic 
potential.”85 A key element of the regime envisaged in the proposal is that PSI would have 
to be made available free of charge and, if this should prove unfeasible due to excessive 
costs, any fee would be limited to the marginal costs. Further, to avoid any clash with 
personal data protection provisions, the proposal states that anonymization costs could be 
included in the cost calculation for specific access requests.86  
Since this legislative initiative is ongoing, it would be premature to draw any conclusions 
concerning the effectiveness of the proposal. However, such a mixed package based on 
lower intensity regulatory intervention fully fits in the overall transition strategy towards an 
API economy.87 In this regard, the proposal states that APIs should be supported by clear 
technical documentation that is complete and available online and, where possible, open 
APIs should be used: European or internationally recognised standard protocols should be 
applied and international standards for datasets should be used where applicable.88  
 
2.5. The risk of regulatory inconsistencies 
We have been witnessing a strong regulatory attempt by the European Commission to 
ensure a comprehensive data sharing environment within the Internal Market through APIs 
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and private ordering solutions. As illustrated above, several regimes have already been put 
forward throughout a quite limited timespan and others are surfacing, such as in the field of 
electricity and health-care.89 Additional concerns have been voiced with reference to the 
agriculture and automotive industries, highlighting the fact that new forms of access to in-
vehicle and “smart farming” data are required to prevent anti-competitive effects.90 In this 
regard, it seems that the EU legislature is not tackling the matter consistently.91 On one 
hand, all of these initiatives share a strong reliance on APIs as a key facilitator to ensure a 
sound and effective data-sharing ecosystem (regardless of the general or sector-specific 
approach of the single legislative instrument). On the other hand, it is equally true that all of 
these attempts are inherently different when it comes to both the underlying rationale and 
practical implementation.  
For personal data portability, nothing is stated with reference to the tools and interoperable 
formats that data holders shall adopt. However, for the account data portability rule the 
European Commission showed much more care in driving its implementation by market 
players. Moreover, the on-going standardization experience under the PSD2 has shown 
how complex and troublesome it could be to ensure a sound and effective adoption of a 
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data portability rule across an industry, despite continuous oversight by the European 
Banking Authority.92 In this respect, the implementation of the free flow of non-personal 
data, as well as personal data portability, or the re-use of government data are likely to be 
even more time-consuming and challenging, given the multifarious interests at stake across 
the industries covered by the scope of these regimes.  
From a comparative perspective, it is worth noting that a general and broad data portability 
right is also the subject of the Australian Government’s recent proposal for the introduction 
of a new Consumer Data Right, which will be established primarily through amendments to 
the Competition and Consumer Act (2010) and the Privacy Act (1988).93 According to the 
proposal, as part of the commitment to giving consumers greater control over their data, all 
customers (both individuals and businesses) will be entitled to exercise the right in relation 
to the classes of data covered by the right. Further, they will have improved access to their 
own data in a usable form and be able to direct its secure transfer to trusted third parties. 
Moreover, the Australian Consumer Data Right will be applied sector-by-sector, following 
an analysis of the merits of applying the right to different classes of data and data holders. 
Hence, since types of data may vary between sectors, there will be an industry-specific 
data-specification process that enables the relevant industry to agree on the types of data 
that will be covered, as well as mechanisms for transfer and security protocols. Notably, the 
Consumer Data Right will commence in the banking sector (i.e. Open Banking), followed 
by the energy and telecommunication sectors. 
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Because the specific method chosen for ensuring interoperability and data portability is 
going to be a crucial element in the success or failure of any regulatory intervention 
providing for data sharing, a clear standardization-oriented approach is highly 
recommended. Since several market players and incumbents have a strong commercial 
incentive to undercut a sound data-sharing regime, policy makers should avoid enacting 
redundant or contradictory regulations and should oversee the implementation of all 
regulations. Furthermore, firms and public bodies would face serious difficulties in 
assessing how to comply with a needlessly confusing legal framework involving data 
sharing.  
 
3. Some lessons from antitrust to address data sharing  
From the analysis carried out above, some considerations can be made with regards to the 
requirements which a thorough regulatory intervention needs to fulfill in order to establish 
a coherent data governance framework. In particular, a broad range of public interests 
including personal data protection, innovation and competition policy need to be taken into 
account and consistently balanced.94 Against this background, competition law can provide 





                                               




3.1. The limits of competition law enforcement 
Competition policy makers have long been debating the role of antitrust law in facilitating 
data sharing in order to ensure a level playing field for all undertakings.95 In accordance 
with competition law, access to data can be obtained only in exceptional circumstances, 
notably those referred to in the essential facility doctrine (EFD).96  
The EFD belongs within the framework of refusal-to-deal and is based on the idea that a 
firm that is a monopolist has a duty to share its facilities with everyone asking for access, 
including competitors. As it provides an exception to the general rule which states that 
firms, even monopolistic ones, are free to contract by choosing whether and with whom to 
make a deal, the EFD represents one of the most controversial antitrust issues. Indeed, the 
provision of a duty to share is likely to create counterincentives to invest due to the limited 
possibility of securing returns. The EFD, originally developed by US courts throughout the 
1980s and then gradually retracted, has gained increasing success in the EU. It now 
represents the main instrument for addressing intellectual property issues from an antitrust 
perspective.  
The case law of the CJEU has defined a framework of exceptional circumstances under 
which a refusal to deal might involve anticompetitive conduct. According to the leading 
case Magill, an undertaking holding an exclusive right may engage in abusive conduct if 
the following conditions are met: (i) the input protected is indispensable due to the lack of 
actual or potential substitutes, (ii) the lack of an objective justification for a refusal to share, 
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(iii) the possibility of the facility owner reserving for itself a secondary market through its 
conduct and (iv) the possibility of such a refusal preventing the appearance of a new 
product which the intellectual property right owner does not offer and for which there is a 
potential consumer demand.97 Further, in Bronner the CJEU clarified that the first 
circumstance (i.e. indispensability) involves the existence of legal, technical or economic 
obstacles so serious that any duplication of the facility is practically impossible or not 
viable.98 Subsequent case law has gradually dismantled both the secondary market 
requirement (e.g., in IMS the CJEU considered the requirement to be met even if that 
market was just hypothetical)99 and the new product requirements (e.g., in Microsoft it was 
argued that this condition is also fulfilled by follow-on innovation).100  
According to the European Commission, there is nothing to prevent competition authorities 
from applying the EFD in the context of data-driven markets.101 However, the exceptional 
circumstances test appears inherently ill suited for tackling competition concerns in data-
driven markets.102 Indeed, in regard to the first condition, there is no agreement among 
scholars whether data may be considered an indispensable asset according to Bronner. 
While some contributions maintain that accessible data (i.e. open data and data which can 
be collected with the help of data brokers) should never be considered indispensable,103 
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others stress that a vast array of obstacles may render the replicability of specific datasets 
by new entrants practically impossible.104  
Additional practical issues are raised by the third condition, namely the exclusion of 
effective competition in the secondary market requirement. This circumstance is met only 
when the undertaking holding the essential input is already marketing in the downstream 
market and, by denying access, forecloses that market to potential new entrants. Such a 
condition, however, is absent in many cases of refusal to share data. 
Moving to the fourth requirement, i.e. the prevention of the appearance of a new product, 
its fulfillment in data market contexts is not straightforward. In data-driven markets, firms 
usually do not know the products or services they might design by using certain data before 
getting access to that data.  
Moreover, even if the EFD requirements were met, compulsory licenses regarding data 
would be difficult to manage for several reasons, such as the scope of the duty to share in 
terms of subject matter (i.e. the identification of a well-defined set of data) and time 
horizon, the definition of terms and conditions for the license, and the compliance with data 
protection law.105  
Setting aside the abovementioned hurdles to applying EFD, the scope of the antitrust 
toolbox is limited by its case-by-case approach. Thus, regulatory interventions seem better 
suited to tackling data-driven economy core issues. Since each industrial sector has specific 
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needs, regulation can be tailored in order to accomplish coherent data access. Nevertheless, 
any regulatory initiative is called to solve two main issues. First, the effectiveness of data 
sharing regulatory interventions is linked to the technical implementation process. Second, 
if access to datasets must be provided, then it is equally necessary to establish appropriate 
compensation schemes able to strike a balance between the conflicting interests of data 
holders and access seekers.  
 
3.2 The role of standardization  
Despite the several legislative initiatives put forward so far by the European Commission, a 
clear view as to who should define APIs and how they should define them is still lacking. 
This is a sensitive issue, as the success of any data sharing regulation is mainly dependent 
on the way the industry implements technicalities. Indeed, interoperability is a cornerstone 
for guaranteeing that, throughout the market, all undertakings can benefit from data access 
regimes.  
As the production and delivery of data-enabled services requires many operators in the 
value chain to cooperate, a European common data space will not reach its full potential 
without the development of open standardized APIs that enhance interoperability and 
simplify the exchange of data between market players. So far, the European Commission 
has encouraged firms all over the Internal Market “to consider using open, standardized and 
well-documented APIs more broadly. This could include making data available in machine-
readable formats and the provision of associated metadata.”106 However, private 
undertakings are basically free to develop APIs and portability tools to comply with 
                                               




regulatory requests according to their own business convenience, which might not be 
aligned with the pro-competition goals of underlying regulations.107 Hence, the concern 
stemming from this scenario is that firms will try to comply in autonomous and non-
standardized ways with new regulatory data sharing obligations, thereby ultimately 
precluding the free flow of data within the Internal Market. Moreover, since data holders 
often retain strong commercial incentives to share as little data as possible with third 
parties, and given that the implementation process of access rules is inherently complex, 
there is a strong risk that incumbents could systematically develop and adopt APIs  that are 
designed to surreptitiously prevent full interoperability with competitors’ interfaces.108 
The case of account data portability can provide a useful insight into how to prevent these 
risks as its implementation process is at a more advanced stage compared with other 
initiatives. 
The PSD2 establishes that technical implementation of the XS2A rule must be carried out 
through a “Level 2 legislative process”. Accordingly, the European Banking Authority has 
been charged with developing five sets of guidelines and six drafts of Regulatory Technical 
Standards (RTS). The drafting process of RTSs demonstrates how difficult it has been to 
strike a balance between different interests and goals. Indeed, the initial draft of the RTS 
published in 2017 raised concerns among FinTech players since it established that the only 
way to access a customer data was through a dedicated interface provided by the bank. 
According to critics, such a system would have allowed banks to interfere surreptitiously in 
the data transfer process, thus hampering the commercial potential of FinTech companies. 
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As a response, later in 2017 the European Commission published an amended version of 
the EBA’s draft RTS and set up a mechanism for direct access to customers’ accounts in 
the case of deficiencies in the dedicated interfaces provided by the bank.109 The draft was 
further amended following the comments drawn up by the EBA. National authorities, upon 
express reassurance with regards to the functioning of the interface, can exempt incumbents 
from the contingent direct access mechanism. Moreover, representatives of TPPs would 
have the opportunity to check the reliability of the banking interfaces and review their 
quality before any exception was granted. At the end of this complex process, the final 
version of the RTS was released by the EBA in March 2018.110   
The next challenge is the definition process of the APIs that will be used by undertakings. 
There is no agreement among market players whether to create them in a standardized way. 
Some market players have shown strong aversion to the establishment of standardized 
APIs, outlining that this could hinder innovation as well as competition by normalizing 
business opportunities across the market. On the other hand, the functioning of a common 
data space would be undermined if undertakings were free to adopt their own APIs, 
conveniently designed according to their own commercial incentives without taking into 
account overall interoperability needs of the market. However, the European Parliament 
took a strong stance in favor of the creation of a set of standardized APIs that undertakings 
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could use as a shared language and highlighted the importance of interoperability for the 
rise of FinTech innovation.111 
It is also worth highlighting the UK Open Banking initiative as a noteworthy attempt to 
safeguard regulatory goals by enacting an array of measures tailored on the PSD2 
framework and aimed at mandating the development of a single, open standardized set of 
APIs for the whole industry.112 In fact, after an open consultation and in-depth coordination 
with other government bodies (such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Treasury and 
the Bank of England), the UK Consumer and Market Authority entrusted the nine largest 
banks with the task of setting an Open Banking Standard together with representatives of 
stakeholders, consumers and SMEs.113  
The UK Open Banking initiative also represents the main reference point of the recent 
Australian reform. Within the proposal to introduce a new Consumer Data Right that 
ensures a general data portability right for consumers, the Australian Government has 
chosen the banking sector as the first industry for the application of the new right. With 
regards to the banking industry data-specification process, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC), in consultation with the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC), will develop draft rules for Open Banking, while the 
Data Standards Body will be responsible for setting technical standards.114 Data61 has been 
appointed as the interim data standards body by the federal government. Data61 is entrusted 
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with developing open standards that enable consumers to safely access data about them 
held by businesses and to direct this information to be transferred via APIs to trusted, 
accredited third parties of their choice. The ACCC will certify technical Data Standards as 
meeting the requirements for the right. Australia’s four major banks have been tasked with 
implementing an open banking standard by 1 July 2019, while all other banks will need to 
comply with these standards by 1 July 2020. 
 
3.3 Are FRAND terms a solution?  
Another key issue stemming from data sharing regimes is the compensation to which the 
data holder is entitled in exchange for providing access. In this regard, the European 
Commission put forward the idea of relying on FRAND terms in the Communication 
“Building a European Data Economy” as well as in the “FinTech Action plan” as a possible 
way to set remuneration rules for the data accessed by third parties.115  
In the realm of intellectual property, these licensing rules have been supported by 
competition authorities and designed by standard-setting organizations (SSOs).116 
Basically, standard essential patent (SEPs) holders are requested to license their patents to a 
standard’s implementer on FRAND terms. However, there is no consensus on either the 
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meaning of the acronym or on the conditions and procedures which need to be followed in 
order to comply with a FRAND commitment.117 Given that there are no generally agreed-
upon tests to determine whether a license does satisfy a FRAND commitment, an 
impressive wave of disputes has arisen in several jurisdictions.  
The European Commission made explicit reference to the Huawei judgment to draw 
inspiration for establishing a workable framework of obligations to reach a data sharing 
agreement based on competition law.118 In Huawei the CJEU did not provide any guidance 
on how to determine FRAND terms but, instead, laid out a procedural framework 
formalizing the stage of a negotiation between potential licensees and licensors aimed at 
reaching a consensus between the parties on a FRAND license. Both the asset holder and 
the access seeker are incentivized to comply with the abovementioned procedure because 
the former will be sheltered from antitrust remedies and the latter will be protected from the 
threat of injunctions.  
However, the CJEU left a number of issues unresolved. Namely, inter alia, the very 
existence of a dominant position in relation to SEPs, the possibility of applying the 
framework to non-competing entities, the optimal way to solve all those issues arising from 
the implementation of the parties’ duties (e.g. the right order to follow in scrutinizing the 
FRAND nature of offers and counter-offers, the timing and basis for counter-offers), and 
the definition of FRAND terms. Indeed, the European Commission has considered the 
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framework still very incomplete and has recently released a Communication with the aim 
of setting out key principles that foster a predictable framework for SEPs.119 
The fact that litigation around FRAND terms is widespread globally demonstrates how far 
from an easy solution for the compensation issue this kind of remedy is.120 With regard just 
to the European landscape, it is worth highlighting that the UK courts in Unwired Planet v. 
Huawei took a different view from that of the CJEU.121 Among other things, the judgment 
stated that only one set of licensing terms can be ultimately considered FRAND in a given 
set of circumstances and that the different steps set forth by the CJEU do not have to be 
followed in a strict way (i.e. the initial offer and counter-offer do not necessarily have to be 
FRAND and the initial offer does not necessarily need to precede the filing of the 
complaint).  
Taking this brief overview of litigation involving FRAND terms into consideration, it is 
important to evaluate whether relying on such a complex framework could actually prove 
useful in dynamic data-driven markets or if it will, instead, just give rise to a flood of 
litigation.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
APIs are the technological gateway of the data-driven economy and have been identified as 
a key enabler of interoperability among private and public undertakings. As the flourishing 
of highly innovative markets based on IoT and AI is increasingly dependent on a sound 
data sharing framework, a systematic adoption of open and standardized APIs by firms and 
developers will be crucial for promoting competition and innovation. The European 
Commission, as part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, has been working on several 
data-sharing instruments which, even if different in terms of rationale, scope and 
competitive impact, share a common reliance on APIs.  
The right to data portability enshrined in the GDPR has been praised as a remarkable tool 
for fostering control rights of individuals as well as boosting competition among data 
holders. Nevertheless, its potential is hindered by the lack of actual interoperability 
initiatives driven by regulators, thereby leaving private undertakings fully free to develop 
their own instruments. Indeed, Microsoft, Google, Twitter and Facebook have already done 
so with the Data Transfer Project. At the same time, a Regulation to ensure a free flow of 
non-personal data within the Internal Market has recently been enacted. Despite some 
normative drawbacks, the initiative clearly relies on suitable APIs as a cornerstone for 
building up a common data market.  
In the meantime, sector-specific data-sharing legislative instruments have surfaced as well. 
First and foremost, the XS2A rule introduced by the PSD2 represents a compelling 
regulatory intervention explicitly designed to unlock competition in retail banking through 
a sector-specific data portability rule. Moreover, its complex implementation process has 




by market players are crucial for its success. Finally, the review proposal of the Directive 
on public sector information aims at completing the picture by fostering reuse and access to 
publicly funded data. In line with the other initiatives, APIs have been identified as the 
right tool for ensuring access to dynamic streams of data.  
As new sector-specific forms of data sharing regimes seem likely to emerge in the near 
future, we deem it appropriate to make a call for a more consistent overall regulatory 
approach which, throughout its implementation process, guides private undertakings 
coherently, according to the specific needs of each industry. In fact, APIs are a technical 
instrument with great competitive potential when properly adopted in accordance with 
standardization initiatives that are able to strike a balance among the many interests 
involved. In this regard, the lesson learned from the XS2A rule enshrined in the PSD2 and 
the Open Banking Initiative in the UK may serve as a blueprint for the effective and 
coherent development of other data sharing instruments or their follow-up implementation 
measures.122   
Furthermore, we pointed out that the strategy envisaged by the European Commission can 
benefit from the experience already gained by competition law in other fields. Accordingly, 
competition authorities are called upon to oversee the transition towards a European 
common data space driven by the regulatory intervention of EU policymakers. Since the 
implementation process of data sharing regimes is complex and time-consuming, all 
regulators involved are expected to prevent subtle forms of anti-competitive practices that 
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risk frustrating the economic potential of data portability regimes. In this regard, 
competition law enforcement might play a residual role by filling the gaps that are likely to 
emerge from sector-specific frameworks as well as general-scope regulations; this is similar 
to what has been proposed for other industries in the past (such as the telecommunications 
sector).123 
Lastly, the ongoing FRAND saga at the intersection of intellectual property and antitrust 
shall serve as a warning against excessive expectation on its potential ability to solve future 
compensation issues arising from hypothetical duties to share data with third parties. Since 
the meaning of the FRAND acronym is inherently ambiguous, there is a risk that a wide 
reliance on it would trigger never-ending litigation, thereby driving up transition costs. 
Thus, benefits and drawbacks of encompassing such commitment within the terms and 
conditions of standardized APIs need to be carefully evaluated before encouraging its 
systematic adoption. 
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